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Abstract. We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May [14], in which the pressure of
the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that
individuals need to collect a minimum score Umin, representing indispensable
resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the
agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful
neighbour (who got Umsn), also take into account if Umsn is above or below the
threshold Umin. If U
msn < Umin an individual has a probability of adopting
the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This
modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection
was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker’s payoff is much worse
than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated
version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a ”win-stay,
lose-shift” criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex
version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation among animals, either within or between species, is widespread
throughout nature [1]-[7]. This presents a puzzle for Darwinists since, according to
Darwin’s theory, the rule among animals should be competition, not cooperation.
Attempting to understand the evolution of cooperation, Maynard Smith and Price
[8] applied game theory to interactions between competing individuals of the same
species that use different strategies for survival. They found that in situations like
combat, in which each individual must decide whether or not to escalate the fight
without knowing his opponent’s decision, the interests of both combatants are best
served if both decide not to escalate the fight.
2 × 2 games (2 players making a choice between 2 alternatives), which showed
their usefulness in Economics and Social Sciences [5], constitute also a basic tool to
model the conflict/cooperation situations in Biology [9]. Furthermore, the marriage
of Game Theory and Darwinian evolution gave rise to a new branch of game theory,
namely evolutionary game theory [10].
In particular one of such games is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), now well
established as a useful tool for studying cooperative interactions among self-interested
agents. The PD game comes from an experimental setup designed by the researchers
at the RAND Corporation M. Dresher and M. Flood. The game refers to an imaginary
situation in which two suspects are arrested near the scene of a crime. The police don’t
have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. The two prisoners
are held in separate cells and offered a deal: If one testifies implicating the other in
the principal crime will go free, while the other, if remains silent, will receive 10 years
in prison. If they both testify against each other, each will receive 5 years. Finally, if
they both remain silent, they will both be convicted by a minor crime and serve one
year. What’s the rational choice for each prisoner? To remain silent (cooperate with
your partner) or to confess (not to cooperate)? The ”dilemma” faced by the prisoners
is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent.
But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they
would have obtained if both had remained silent. This puzzle illustrates a conflict
between individual and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational
self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to
rational self-interest. Formulated in its general form the PD game involves two players
each confronting two choices: cooperate (C) or defect (D) and each makes his choice
without knowing what the other will do. The possible outcomes for the interaction of
both agents are: 1) they can both cooperate: (C,C) and get the ”reward” for mutual
cooperation R, 2) they can both defect: (D,D) and get the ”punishment” for mutual
defection or 3) one of them cooperates and the other defects: (C,D); in that case the
one who played C gets the ”sucker’s payoff” S while agent who played D gets the
”temptation to defect” T . The following payoff matrix summarizes the payoffs for row
actions when confronting with column actions:
M =
(
(R,R) (S, T )
(T, S) (P, P )
)
,
with the four payoffs obeying the inequalities:
T > R > P > S. (1)
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Clearly it pays more to defect: if your opponent defects, and you cooperate you will
end up with the worst payoff. On the other hand, even if your opponent cooperates,
you should defect because in that case your payoff is T which is higher than R. In
other words, independently of what the other player does, defection D yields a higher
payoff than cooperation and is the dominant strategy for rational agents. Nevertheless,
reasoning that way both agents get P which is worst than R.
A possible way out for this dilemma is to play the game repeatedly. In this
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), in which condition (1) is supplemented with the
condition:
2R > S + T, (2)
there are several strategies that outperform the dominant one-shot ’always D’ strategy
and lead to some non-null degree of cooperation. The tournaments organized by
Axelrod [5], [11] in the 80s´ were very illuminating. He invited researchers from
different fields to contribute a strategy, in the form of a computer program, to play
the Prisoner’s Dilemma against each other and themselves repeatedly. Each strategy
specified whether to cooperate or defect based on the previous moves of both the
strategy and its opponent. The programs were then ranked according to the total
payoff accumulated. The winning program, was also the simplest: ’TIT FOR TAT’
(TFT), which plays C on the first move, and on all subsequent moves copies the
choice of its opponent on the previous move. In an ecological approach [12], the scores
from round two were used to calculate the relative frequencies of the strategies in
a hypothetical population. The strategies were then submitted to each subsequent
round in proportion to their cumulative payoff in the previous round. In the long
run, TFT outcompeted its rivals and went to fixation. Axelrod and Hamilton [11]
used these ecological competition between strategies as a basis for their analysis of the
evolution of reciprocal altruism. This model is applicable in two opposite situations:
on the one hand, in the case of higher animals, which can distinguish between their
various opponents in order to reciprocate [13], discouraging thus defection. On the
other hand, in the case of very simple organisms who have only one opponent in its
lifetime.
Nowak and May [14] found another way to escape from the dilemma: the
incorporation of territoriality in evolutionary game theory favours cooperation. The
authors proposed simple cellular automata (CA) for general ecological systems
involving indiscriminating organisms who play against several opponents (their
neighbours). They neglected all strategical complexities or memories of past
encounters considering unconditional cellular automata i.e. agents using unconditional
strategies (each cell is either in a C or D state), as opposed to the conditional ones
like TFT, the simpleton [15] or PAVLOV [16] ”win-stay, lose-shift”, etc. Cells simply
play repeatedly with their neighbours and in the next round or generation adopt the
state of the most successful cell of their neighbourhood (the one that collected the
highest score among the cell itself and its neighbours). Coexistence of both states
or behaviours were found for a simplified version of the PD in which the punishment
P is equal to the sucker’s payoff S ‡, implying then a ”weak dilemma” (maximum
punishment i.e. the minimum possible value of P ). Taking R = 1 and P = S = 0
allows to parameterise the payoff matrix in terms of just the parameter T . Szabo´
‡ Indeed this is the frontier between the PD game an another interesting game, called chicken by
game theorists and Hawk-Dove (H-D) game by evolutionary biologists, in which the punishment for
mutual defection is the worst payoff i.e. T > R > S > P .
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and To¨ke [17] slightly modified the Nowak-May (N-M) model with the addition of
randomness: players are chosen to update their states randomly by copying the state
of one of its neighbours with a probability depending on the payoff difference. They
measured the fraction of cooperators c for different values of the temptation to defect T
and found a continuous transition from c = 1 to c = 0 as T increases. A problem with
these simple spatial games is that if P is augmented until it becomes non negligible
compared with the reward R then cooperation disappears and all the individuals end
playing D.
An alternative to go beyond weak dilemmas is to consider more sophisticated
players, with m-steps memory and strategies involving conditional probabilities, as
Lindgren and Nordahl [18] did. They considered payoff matrices parameterised
in terms of two parameters, T/R and P/R (S = 0), and found the evolution of
cooperation for payoff matrices beyond ”weak” dilemmas. However, pursuing as much
generality as possible without sacrificing the simplicity, which is part of the N-M model
beauty, in this paper we explore a different approach. Our starting point is realising
that, interesting as it is, the N-M model lacks a fundamental ingredient, namely that
of the stress exerted by the environment on the individuals. This is a crucial factor in
order to explain the emergence of cooperation between self-interested individuals even
when they are very simple (without requiring long term memory nor distinguishing
”tags” nor access to sophisticated strategies and, of course, no rational behaviour).
The basic idea is that individuals need to collect, when playing with their z neighbours,
a payoff above certain threshold Umin in order to prosper. In an ecosystem Umin
represents the minimal resources (nutrients, energy, etc.) without which organisms
die; in economics it may correspond to some threshold below which the business is no
longer profitable, etc. Thus, although D players are the most successful for P−S large
enough, when Umin > z(P − S) they cannot achieve the critical payoff if surrounded
by an entire neighbourhood of D’s and so some of them will be replaced by C players.
We use a normalized payoff matrix with R = 1 and S = 0. Besides the 3 parameters:
Umin, T and P we include a probability p for players of adopting the behaviour that is
the opposite of the one used by the most successful neighbour (msn). In the simplest
model version an individual has a probability of behaving different from the msn
if the score of the msn is below Umin. This simple recipe allows the evolution of
cooperation even when the punishment P is relatively soft i.e. when the sucker’s
payoff is much worse than the payoff for mutual defection (P >> S). Furthermore,
it gives rise to states of universal cooperation. We also consider a more sophisticated
hybrid model version in which the selective rule of copying the behaviour of the msn
is supplemented with a ”win-stay, lose-shift” criterion. That is, individuals also take
into account if their own scores U are below or above Umin to update their behaviour.
This version, although more complex, seems well-grounded since it is widely known
that Pavlovian strategies play a central role in animal behaviour [19]-[23]. Moreover,
the remarkable experiments conducted by Milinski and Wedekind [24],[25] revealed
that, humans engaged in social dilemma games use by far strategies of the kind of
”win-stay, lose-shift”.
For the different model versions, we explore a subspace of the space of parameters
{T, P, Umin, p} measuring the fraction of cooperators and quantities characterizing the
resulting cluster structure.
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2. The Basic Model
The players, which can adopt only two unconditional strategies or behaviours when
playing with their neighbours: cooperate (C) or defect (D), are thus represented by
binary state cells of a two dimensional automaton. In this work we restrict ourselves
to square grids and two types of neighbourhood: a)von Neumann neighbourhood,
consisting of the z = 4 first neighbouring cells of a given cell, and b) Moore
neighbourhood, formed by the z = 8 cells surrounding a given cell. Typical grid
sizes range from 50 × 50 to 500 × 500. Periodic boundary conditions are used. The
score U of a given player is the sum of all the payoffs it collects against its neighbours.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the different scores for a player depending on the number
of C cells in its neighbourhood. The dynamic is synchronous: all the agents update
their states simultaneously at the end of each lattice sweep.
4C, 0D 3C, 1D 2C, 2D 1C, 3D 0C, 4D
C 4 3 2 1 0
D 4T 3T + P 2T + 2P T + 3P 4P
Table 1. Score U for a player depending on its state C (row 1) or D (row 2) and
the number of C and D agents in its neighbourhood for the z = 4 case.
8C, 0D 7C, 1D 6C, 2D 5C, 3D 4C, 4D 3C, 5D 2C, 6D 1C, 7D 0C, 8D
C 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
D 8T 7T + P 6T + 2P 5T + 3P 4T + 4P 3T + 5P 2T + 6P T + 7P 8P
Table 2. The same as Table 1 but for z = 8 neighbours.
In the CA of ref. [14] natural selection is implemented very simply: each agent or
player adopts the state of the most successful neighbour (msn) who got Umsn. Here,
if Umsn is below the threshold Umin, we allow the individuals to adopt the opposite
state with a probability p. The rationale for this is that blindly copying the most
successful neighbour, when its score doesn’t reach a critical threshold, may not be, in
the long run, the most efficient strategy from an evolutionary point of view.
We consider two possible variants:
(i) Simplest variant: Conditional copying the most successful neighbour.
If Umsn ≥ Umin, the player copies the state of its msn. Otherwise, if U
msn <
Umin, the player has a probability p of adopting the opposite state.
(ii) Variant 1 + death of organisms.
This variant contemplates the possibility that organisms that don’t reach the
threshold Umin die and some cells remain unoccupied. The rules are the same
as above except that in the case when Umsn < Umin, instead of adopting the
strategy of the msn, the player dies with probability 1 − p leaving an empty
cell. An empty cell updates its state copying the one of its msn with probability
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1 − p (adopting the opposite behaviour with probability p). Finally, an empty
cell surrounded by empty cells remains unoccupied in the next round.
It turns out that, for both variants of the model, the system reaches a steady
state with a definite value c for the fraction of agents playing C after a transient.
The duration of the transient depends on the lattice size and the neighbourhood. For
instance for a 50× 50 lattice and z = 8 it last typically between 100 and 200 rounds.
To avoid dependence on the initial conditions, the measures correspond to
averages over an ensemble of 100 systems with arbitrary initial conditions. The
standard deviation is about 7 percent so this averages are quite representative.
Here, we present results for a subspace of the parameter space {T, P, Umin, p}.
We choose definite values for the punishment P and the probability parameter p,
specifically: P = 0.5§ and p = 0.1. The temptation parameter T is varied between 1
and 2. A threshold Umin > zP is required in order to avoid the all D state; on the
other hand Umin > zT doesn’t make sense since no one can reach this threshold. Thus,
the parameter space reduces to the square plane T − Umin delimited by 1 ≤ T ≤ 2
and zP ≤ Umin ≤ zT .
After a transient, the steady or asymptotic fraction of C agents c is computed for
a grid of points in the T -Umin plane using lattices of relatively modest size: 50× 50.
Similar results hold for 100× 100 lattices or bigger.
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Figure 1. Asymptotic frequency of cooperators for the simplest model, for
p = 0.1, (a) z=4 neighbours and (b) z=8 neighbours.
Figures 1.a and 1.b corresponding to the first model variant show a similar
dependence on frequency of cooperators with T and Umin. Note that, when Umin >
zP , the fraction of cooperators raises from zero to a non negligible value regardless
§ This value of the punishment implies a non weak dilemma and, both for z = 4 or z = 8, leads to
c = 0 when simulating the model of ref. [14].
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of the value of T ‖. The explanation of this is simple: a D agent surrounded by D’s
gets a score zP that is below the surviving threshold, and thus has a probability p
of becoming C in the next round. Basically three regions can be distinguished in the
plots:
• A stepladder region emerges from the right border Umin = zP .
• For not too large values of T and Umin there is a high peak of cooperation,
delimited to the left by Umin = zR = z (when all the cells play C).
• Finally, beyond Umin = zR = z, c reaches a plateau delimited by the straight line
Umin(T ) = zT (Umin greater than zT is an unreachable score in the game we are
considering).
To understand the peak of cooperation it is illuminating to consider a small
deviation of T from 1: T = 1 + ǫ. Therefore, for z = 8 and P = 0.5 the Table 2
becomes the Table 3. For Umin greater than 6, the only D agents which can achieve
the minimum Umin are the ones surrounded by at least 4 C’s (see row 2 of Table
3), so cooperation grows dramatically. This corresponds to ǫ . 0.16 (for increasing
values of ǫ, D agents surrounded by less than 4 C’s will survive and we cannot expect
great values for c). When Umin = 8 c drops abruptly since even C agents surrounded
entirely by other C’s cannot survive anymore.
8C, 0D 7C, 1D 6C, 2D 5C, 3D 4C, 4D 3C, 5D 2C, 6D 1C, 7D 0C, 8D
C 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
D 8.0 + 8ǫ 7.5 + 7ǫ 7.0 + 6ǫ 6.5 + 5ǫ 6.0 + 4ǫ 5.5 + 3ǫ 5 + 2ǫ 4.5 + ǫ 4
Table 3. Same as Table 2 for T = 1 + ǫ, P = 0.5
The stepladder structure for z = 8 (a similar analysis holds for z = 4) can be
easily explained considering the scores for D agents of Table 2. As long as Umin
increases each D agent needs more C agents in its surroundings in order to achieve
the threshold. So cooperation grows with Umin by steps at the values mentioned
before: Umin = T +7P , Umin = 2T +6P and so on, which correspond to straight lines
with different slopes in the (T, Umin) plane. Finally, when Umin > 8T the minimum
required is above any agent’s possible score, then the fraction of agents C one time
step further will be given by
c(t+ 1) = pfD + (1 − p)fC , (3)
where fD stands for the fraction of agents (C and D) whose most successful neighbour
is a D-cell and fC is the fraction of agents (C and D) whose most successful neighbour
is a C-cell. As none of the agents achieves the threshold, the state of all of them is
updated with probability p to a state opposite to the one of the msn. For small values
of p, fC ≈ 0 (since a C agent needs to be surrounded by a minimum number of C
agents to be the most successful), fD ≈ 1 and finally c ≈ p. This explains why the
height of the plateau coincides with the probability p ¶.
The landscape that emerges from the second model variant (see Fig. 2.a and Fig.
2.b) is very similar to the one produced by the first variant.
‖ At least in the considered T interval: 1 < T < 2.
¶ Besides p = 0.1, we checked this also for p = 0.2 and p = 0.3
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Figure 2. Asymptotic frequency of cooperators for the empty cells variant, for
p = 0.1, (a) z=4 neighbours and (b) z=8 neighbours; frequency is normalized by
the total number of cells (including empty ones)
3. Hybrid Model: Natural Selection Complemented with a Pavlovian
Criterion.
A relevant input for an agent to assess its performance in a game is the comparison
of its own score U with Umin. If it is above Umin then the agent’s behaviour may
be worth keeping even if it is not the most successful in the neighbourhood. The
behaviour updating rule thus becomes more sophisticated and instead of the previous
rule we have:
(i) If Umsn < Umin: The player adopts the opposite state of its msn but now with
probability 1− p.
(ii) If Umsn ≥ Umin: There are two alternatives depending on its score U :
• If U < Umin, the player keeps its state with probability p (adopts the state
of its msn with probability 1− p).
• If U ≥ Umin the player keeps its state with probability 1 − p (adopts the
state of its msn with probability p).
Therefore, this model interpolates between the ordinary evolutionary recipe of
copying the most successful neighbour and the ”win-stay, lose-shift” criterion of the
game analysed in detail by Herz [26].
3.1. Frequency of cooperators
Again, the system reaches a steady state with a definite value c for the fraction of
agents playing C after a transient. This hybrid model produces qualitatively similar
results, but there are remarkable modifications in the landscape shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3. Asymptotic frequency of cooperators for the hybrid variant, for
p = 0.1, (a) z=4 neighbours and (b) z=8 neighbours.
Firstly, we observe a strong increase in c for all the parameter space surrounding
the peak zone. In particular, note the height of the plateau and the step formation.
Secondly, most part of the plateau is replaced by steeply ”cliffs”. Figure 4 shows
the fraction of cooperators for T = 1.6, z = 8. Between zP (= 4) and zR(= 8),
the fraction c increases almost monotonously with Umin. However, once Umin=8 is
reached, the fraction of cooperators falls down drastically. This is due to the fact that
C agents surrounded entirely by C’s can no longer survive and turn into D agents with
probability 1 − p = 0.9. Since some of the D agents still have a payoff above Umin,
they survive to the next round, so cooperation fraction should decrease. As long as
Umin increases, more C’s are neccesary in the neighbourhood of a D for this agent to
keep its strategy, so cooperation would increase again.
When Umin > 8T the equation (3) is replaced by
c(t+ 1) = (1− p)fD + pc(t). (4)
Hence, in the steady state (c(t+ 1) = c(t)) we have the solution c = fD.
3.2. Cluster structure
An additional novelty of this model, connected with the greater richness in the c
landscape (see Fig. 3), is the cluster structure which exhibits power law scaling for a
restricted region in the T -Umin plane (for the basic model no power-laws were found).
In this subsection we analyse the cluster structure and spatial patterns in the three
different regions of the plane T−Umin identified in the previous subsection. We present
results for the z = 8 Moore neighbourhood, since it is the one that exhibits more clear
cut results. Fig. 5 shows snapshots of the steady state at four representative points
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Figure 4. Asymptotic frequency of cooperators as a function of Umin for T=1.6,
z=8.
in the T − Umin plane: (a) [T=1.5,Umin=11.9] belonging to the plateau (c ≃0.75),
(b) [T=1.06,Umin=6.9] belonging to the peak (c ≃0.91), (c) [T=1.2,Umin=5.5] at the
side of the peak (c ≃0.5) and (d) [T=1.6,Umin=7.5] belonging to the stepladder region
(c ≃0.4).
For [T=1.5,Umin=11.9], although fraction of cooperators is stable the spatial pat-
terns change constantly as a consequence of the transition rules. One of these patterns
is shown in Fig. 5.a. For [T=1.06,Umin=6.9], giant stable clusters dominate the lattice
as expected from the high level of cooperation in that region as shown in Fig. 5.b. At
the side of the cooperation peak there are spatial stable structures of clusters as the
ones shown in Fig. 5.c. When we move away from the peak into the region bounded
between 2T + 6P ,4T + 4P and Umin = 8 scale invariance emerges: clusters of all size
occur as can be seen from Fig. 5.d for T = 1.6 and Umin = 7.5. In this case we are in
presence of constantly changing spatial patterns again. Histograms of the size distri-
bution of clusters for the four above points in the T −Umin plane are shown in Fig. 6.
The histogram 6.b shows that only exist (giant) clusters for a narrow interval of sizes.
As we move to regions in the phase space with lower values of c, a greater diversity of
sizes occur (see Figs. 6.a and 6.c) until 6.d clearly shows a power law distribution with
exponent −1.6357± 0.0001. Power laws are the signature of organization into a criti-
cal state. It indicates that the system exhibits the highest pattern of diversity: there
are few large structures and many smaller clusters. This power-law scaling emerges
only for a very reduced region in the plane T − Umin in the vicinity of the point
[T = 1.6, Umin = 7.5]. In that sense this scale-free behaviour seems more to ordinary
critical phenomena (second order phase transitions), where a fine-tuning of the control
parameters is required, than to the much more robust self-organized criticality (SOC).
We also explored the correlation function in this region and found a scaling
with distance r proportional to e
−
r
ξ
r
. Fig. 7 shows this function for the point
[T = 1.6, Umin = 7.5] where the correlation length ξ takes the value 2.95.
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Figure 5. Steady state cooperation maps for the z = 8 hybrid model (with
p=0.1) for: (a)T = 1.5, Umin = 11.9 (b)T = 1.06, Umin = 6.9 (c)T = 1.2,
Umin = 5.5 (d)T = 1.6, Umin = 7.5. Black cells correspond to C agents and
white cells to D agents. The mean frequency of cooperators corresponding to
each map is (a)c = 0.75 (b)c = 0.91 (c)c = 0.50 (d)c = 0.40.
Besides the size distribution of clusters, the relationship between the perimeter
and the area of the clusters provides useful information on their geometry. The area
A of a cluster is the number of all connected cells with a given strategy (C or D) and
its perimeter ℓ is defined as the number of cells that form its boundary (those cells of
the cluster with at least one neighbour not belonging to it). We compute the mean
perimeter ℓ(A) for a given area A averaging over all the perimeters of clusters with
given area A. Plots of ℓ vs. A for the four T, Umin points treated before are shown in
Fig. 8.
Figure 8.b is consistent with the very narrow range of sizes of C clusters observed
in Fig. 6.b (something similar happens for Fig. 6.a but without a clear dependence
of perimeter with area). In Fig. 8.d -which corresponds to a power law in size
distribution as shown in Fig. 6.d- the mean perimeter scales linearly with the area.
From this linearity it follows that the ratio of perimeter to interior (being the interior
A − ℓ(A)) becomes independent of the cluster size. The coefficient of the line ℓ(A)
is 0.8369 ± 0.0001. This result differs greatly from the square root dependence of ℓ
with A expected for regular geometry and is an indicator of the ramified structure of
clusters (see Fig. 5.d).
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Figure 6. Dependence of the number of C(o) clusters with size (in logarithmic
scale) for the hybrid model with z = 8 for (a)T = 1.5, Umin = 11.9 (b)T = 1.06,
Umin = 6.9 (c)T = 1.2, Umin = 5.5 (d)T = 1.6, Umin = 7.5 and p = 0.1. For (a)
and (b) (where big C clusters dominate) the dependence of the number of D(+)
clusters with size is also shown. Measures were performed on a 500 × 500 lattice
and clusters sampled over 100 rounds after transient.
4. Discussion
We have shown how cooperation among self-interested individuals can emerge from
evolution in PD games, involving quite arbitrary payoff matrices (instead of just weak
dilemmas), using the simplest possible agents: unconditional strategists, without long
term memory and without distinguishing ”tags”. This allows the applicability of the
model to a wide variety of contexts from natural to social sciences.
The main idea was to include the influence of the environment exerting pressure
on individuals to cooperate even when the punishment for defecting is relatively soft.
This is implemented by requiring a minimum score Umin necessary for agents to carry
on vital functions. In particular, for moderate values of the temptation to defect T ,
there is an intermediate range of values of Umin that maximizes cooperation among
self-interested agents producing a state of ”universal cooperation”.
Our findings might be connected with questions in evolutionary genetics like the
effects of deleterious mutations on fitness. Mutations, in spite of being the ultimate
engine for evolution, in general have a negative effect on fitness. It has been widely
accepted that these deleterious fitness effects are, on average, magnified in stressful
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(where ξ = 2.95) in solid line.
environments. Recent experimental measures of growth rates of E.coli mutants under a
diverse set of environmental stresses suggest just the opposite: the effects of deleterious
mutations can sometimes be ameliorated in stressful environments [27]. A possibility
is that C-inclined organisms may be regarded as deleterious mutants in the case of no
stress which can take over the population under some (appropriate) degree of stress.
It is worth remaking that the more sophisticated model, that results when
supplementing the ordinary evolutionary recipe of copying the most successful
neighbour with a Pavlovian ”win-stay, lose-shift” criterion, exhibits two relevant
properties. The first is global optimisation i.e. it enhances the cooperation level.
The second is the emergence of power-law scaling in the size distribution for clusters
of C-agents. Power-laws were also found in a different study of cellular automata
playing the PD game with Pavlovian strategies [28]. However, in that case, this
scaling behaviour is much more robust than the one we found here which holds only
for quite reduced region in the T − Umin plane.
The effect of requiring a threshold has been analysed in social sciences. For
instance, in relation to reinforcement learning by Borgers and Sarin [29],[30], although
treatment is quite different. Indeed, this threshold represents an aspiration level and
may improve the decision maker’s long-run performance.
To conclude, we envisage some future extensions of this (these) model (models).
For instance to explore the effect of heterogeneities, in the environment (a landscape
dependent Umin function) or in the agents (different payoff matrices, different types of
individuals, etc.). In addition, the spatial networks observed in nature are in general
not uniform square lattices like the ones considered here. So another interesting
direction that seems worth studying is to consider more realistic network topologies,
for example scale free [31] or small worlds networks [32].
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Figure 8. The perimeter ℓ plotted as a function of C’s(o) cluster area A for the
hybrid model with z = 8 for (a)T = 1.5, Umin = 11.9 (b)T = 1.06, Umin = 6.9
(c)T = 1.2, Umin = 5.5 (d)T = 1.6, Umin = 7.5 and p = 0.1. For (a) and (b)
perimeter of D’s(+) is also shown. Measures were performed on a 500×500 lattice
and clusters sampled over 100 rounds after transient.
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